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ABSTRACT
In the modern world, regulation is a necessity, especially on an international scale.
PMSCs or Private Military Security Contractors are groups that are involved with
militaries, and in conflict zones around the world.1 Due to their unique functions and
place in international law, they essentially fall into a regulatory gap. PMSCs are nonstate actors2, but perform a series of roles and functions historically associated with
the state. They can be used in multitudes of situations and have even been recruited in
the war against drugs.3 Some see military contractors as, or similar to mercenaries,4
while others disagree. Many, if not most, PMSC personnel do not fit the criteria that
comprise the definition of a mercenary 5 , as set forth by article 47 of Additional
Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention.6
The issue becomes how best to regulate PMSCs and their personnel. Two options for
regulation appear to be the most efficient, first, Kristine Huskey's three phase plan
which segments the phases of PMSC operations and regulates each in a different
way 7 . Secondly, the option of categorization; labeling military contractors and
regulating them based on the category they are placed in. Categorization is a
possibility however PMSC personnel have a multitude of roles, and therefore have
different responsibilities and regulations. One category that includes all roles and
1

Sid Ellington, The Rise of Battlefield Private Contractors, 13 PUBLIC INTEGRITY 131–148, 132,
(2011), (referencing Weidenbaum, Murray. 2003. “The Changing Structure of the U.S. Defense
Industry.”
Orbis 47, no. 4:693–703.).
2
Antoine Perret, Privatization of the War on Drugs in Mexico and Colombia, 7 INTERDISCIPLINARY
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 45–67, 46, (2012).
3

Id. at 45

4

David Perry, Blackwater vs. bin Laden: The Private Sector’s Role in American Counterterrorism, 31
COMPARATIVE STRATEGY 41–55, 41, (2012).
5

Sarah V. Percy, This Gun’s for Hire: A New Look at an Old Issue, 58 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 721,
724,725,(2003), (referencing Quoted in Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of
the
International Law of Armed Conflicts (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), 375
(footnote 83)).
6
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 47, 8 June 1977.
7

Kristine A. Huskey, Accountability for Private Military and Security Contractors in the International
Legal Regime, 31 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS193, 193, (2012).
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responsibilities is that of a MNC, or multinational corporation. Labeling PMSCs as
corporations, categorizes them as what they truly are, businesses. Profit and future
business are what PMSCs strive for, and therefore a way to regulate them. 8 Some
PMSCs are not combat oriented9, and there fore it would be incorrect to lump all
PMSCs in together.
When analyzing the international regulation of multinational corporations, parallels to
PMSCs begin to appear. Both operate internationally, and both have a goal of profit.
By understanding the operations and regulations of MNCs the international
community could potentially find a way to categorize and regulate PMSCs. Huskey's
three phase theory, in combination with the multinational corporation label, is a novel
system by which regulation, as well as responsibility can be placed.

8

Andrew Clapham, Introductory Remarks by Andrew Clapham, 200, 107 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
199, 200, (2013).
9
P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 85, (2003).
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I. Introduction
Contemporary warfare has created need and use for new technologies and groups of
professionals in the “theatre of war”. Modern military forces use outside advisers and
personnel to aid in their operations and provide support functions. 10 One of the most
controversial and impactful groups involved with militaries throughout the world are
Private Military Security Contractors, or PMSC’s. PMSC’s have really come into the
public eye following their involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, on behalf
of the United States. However, amongst most people, little is known about PMSC’s
and the ways in which they function during a time of war. PMSC’s are a new
phenomenon, and function as non-state actors, and therefore can be problematic for
the international community as a whole. 11 In this paper I attempt to analyze the
current ideas and opinions regarding PMSC’s and their functions during international
conflicts. I plan to analyze the works of many scholars, including both the positive
and negative aspects of the business of military contracting. I will also speak about
the reasons many feel there needs to be a regulation of these contractors, as well as
the standing of PMSC’s under international law. From there I hope to provide
theoretical categories in which Military Contractors, both as individuals and groups,
can fit; under international law. As the categories are listed, this paper will also
analyze the effectiveness of regulating these PMSCs within the scope of each
category. In addition there will be an analysis of international rules and regulations
regarding multinational corporations. From there, I will contemplate the similarities of
PMSCs and multinational corporations, and why this categorization may fit under
international law. From there I will analyze how said regulating PMSCs as
multinationals could work using Husky’s three phase theory. This paper is framed
around the regulation of PMSCs, and an analysis of their regulation if categorized as
multinational corporations.

10

RICHARD QUIGLY, MILITARY CONTRACTORS : LEGAL STATUS, OVERSIGHT AND SECURITY, 8, (2009),
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10671302 (last visited Dec 17, 2014).
11

Antoine Perret, Privatization of the War on Drugs in Mexico and Colombia, 7 INTERDISCIPLINARY
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 45–67, 46, (2012).
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II.

Military contractors introduced

Throughout history, non-military personnel were used to perform functions during
times of war. It is well known that kings and rulers used foreign soldiers for combat
during military campaigns,12 and that civilians sometimes performed functions for a
military force. 13 According to Sid Ellington “America has used civilians in noncombat roles in almost every American conflict”.14 However, in the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, America has been using military contractors to perform a variety of roles
in support of the military forces. Since the war began, private military and security
contractors or PMSCs have been used in functions ranging from “health care to
combat support.”15So when did these PMSCs become so widely used? When speaking
about America particularly, the department of defense “formalized the relationship
between civilian contractors and the military forces”,16 since the invasion of Grenada.
But it was during the 1990’s that the idea that the government could “outsource
services to private contractors” really began to make waves.17 Also, following Dick
Cheney’s rise to power and his inclusion of Donald Rumsfeld into the fray, there has
been a drive, spearheaded by Rumsfeld, to privatize military functions. 18 It was a
drive to privatize all functions that were not “core war fighting functions.” 19 Sid
Ellington also states that the argument could be made that military contractors
actually form the largest segment of what President Bush called his “coalition of the
willing.”20 While America’s use of PMSC organizations is the central focus, in the

12

Sid Ellington, The Rise of Battlefield Private Contractors, 13 PUBLIC INTEGRITY 131–148, 136,
(2011), (referencing Housen, Roger T. 2002. The Privatization of Warfare: Back to the Future.
Washington,D.C.:
National
Defense
University.
Available
at
www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA442603&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, accessed January 30, 2011.).
13

Id. (referencing Pelton, Robert Y. 2006. Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror. New
York:Crown Publishers.).
14

Id.

15

Id. (referencing Weidenbaum, Murray. 2003. “The Changing Structure of the U.S. Defense Industry.”
Orbis 47, no. 4:693–703.).
16
Perry, supra note 4.
17
Sid Ellington, The Rise of Battlefield Private Contractors, 13 PUBLIC INTEGRITY 131–148, 135,
(2011).
18
Id. (referencing Shelton, Henry H. 2001. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.:
Department of Defense. Available at www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf, accessed
January 30, 2011).
19
Id. (referencing Shelton, Henry H. 2001. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.:
Department of Defense. Available at www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf, accessed
January 30, 2011).
20
Id. (referencing Avant, Deborah D. 2005. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing
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public eye, when speaking about private military contractors, it should be said that
military contractors have been used in a variety of different countries for a variety of
different reasons. In recent years PMSC’s have been used in the war against drugs in
Mexico and Colombia.21 PMSC’s have also been used by the American government in
counter terrorism efforts following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 22 In David Perry’s
Blackwater vs. bin Laden: The Private Sector’s Role in American Counterterrorism,
Perry states that military contractors are “the corporate evolution of the profession of
mercenaries” 23 . While it is not necessarily true that military contractors are
mercenaries, based on the international legal definition of a mercenary, it is interesting
that the word “corporate” was used. PMSC’s no matter if they are mercenaries, or
legal combatants are now functioning mainly as corporations,24 and this is how they
conduct their business in a modern world.
A. PMSCs definition and roles
The first and most important fact about PMSC’s is that they are non- state actors, and
thereby they are not held to the same “doctrines of international law”25 that states are.
Without an official category to place them in, whether it be mercenaries, unlawful
combatants, combatants or even corporations, the international community is not able
to regulate them as easily, if at all. “The mechanisms of control and accountability
have not adapted due to the novelty of the phenomenon and its constant
evolution.”26Due to this evolution, international law is behind, and left trying to patch
this gap. According to Nigel White “structural inadequacies in the evolution of
international law, in regards to states and state based actors, is why PMSCs are not

Security. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press., Horton, Scott, Kevin Lanigan, and Michael
McClintock. 2008. Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity. New York:
Human Rights First.
Available at www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/08115-usls-psc-final.pdf, accessed
January 30, 2011.).
21

Perret, supra note 2, at 45.

22

Perry, supra note 4.

23

Id.

24

Clapham, supra note 8, at 199.

25

Nigel D. White, Due Diligence Obligations of Conduct: Developing a Responsibility Regime for
PMSCs, 31 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS233, 233, (2012).
26

Perret, supra note, 2, at 46.
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regulated.”27 What has this gap in international law lead to? To quote Perret, “this
privatization is the presence of a non-state actor allowed to use force in contexts
where once only states were allowed to do so.”28
PMSC personnel have a wide variety of contractual obligations and responsibilities.
The easiest way to explain the multitude of functions served by PMSC personnel is to
break them down into three categories that P.W. Singer has identified recently. These
three categories are based on the services the PMSCs have performed for the U.S.
military. The first category includes “military support firms that deliver
‘supplementary military services... including logistics, intelligence, technical support,
supply, and transportation’”. The second category covers “military consulting firms
that supply ‘advisory and training services integral to the operation and restructuring
of a client's armed forces’”. The third and final category “military provider firms that
focus on the tactical environment by running active combat operations”29 are the most
controversial contractors that are the stereotypical example in most people’s minds.
These categories do provide us with a good idea of the variety of functions that PMSC
personnel can provide. Many PMSC personnel may never carry weapons or see
combat. This then leads us to the question, should we regulate PMSCs and their
personnel?
B. Regulation and purpose
Military contractors, as a whole, seem to be viewed in a negative light in the eyes of
many scholars and the public. But why is this? Many believe, PMSC personnel are
joining conflicts in order to make money, in similar fashion to mercenaries. To believe
a person would willingly put themselves in positions where they might have to kill,
for money, is disturbing to many people. According to Sara Percy, at one point in
PMSCs “combat services were simply too controversial and international distaste for
the open provision of combat helped push Executive Outcomes and Sandline out of

27
28

White, supra note, 25.
Perret, supra note, 2.

29

Katherin J. Chapman, The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors’ Criminal Accountability
under the UCMJ, 63 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1047–1080, 1049, (2010), (referencing P.W. SINGER,
CORPORATE WARRIORS; THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY92-97
(Cornell Univ. Press 2003)).

4

business.” 30 PMSC’s however, have many functions besides fighting in armed
conflicts, and many of the conflicts they do participate in are important and can have a
positive impact on the world. For example, military contractors are being used in the
“war on drugs” 31 as stated above. This, to many, is a positive use of military
contractors, and a good use of their skill and resources. In some cases PMSC
companies avoided combat. For example Percy states, “Tim Spicer started a new
company, Aegis, which was specifically designed to avoid combat, but would provide
other security services.”32
In the modern world, PMSC personnel are being used for a multitude of purposes in
both conflict and post-conflict situations.33 As Francesco Francioni said, the use of
PMSC personnel has become a “trend” and they “replace soldiers and members of the
armed forces in a variety of situations that include armed conflict, prolonged military
occupation, peacekeeping, and territorial administration in post-conflict institutional
building and intelligence gathering.” 34 So if we must accept the use of Private
Military Contractors in contemporary global activities, should we not regulate them?
The lack of regulation on PMSC personnel is alarming. It is not that PMSC personnel
are necessarily better or worse than any official armed forces, it is that any
international body, or any international business (depending on how you view
PMSCs) should be regulated, especially if they are used in conflict and post-conflict
situations. Regulation should not just be used to serve the international community, it
should be there for the PMSC personnel themselves, to avoid liability, and it should
be there for the hiring state as well. If a hiring state has even the slightest chance of
being held accountable for the actions of PMSC personnel, they need a system of
regulation to provide evidence that they performed every action necessary to prevent
PMSC personnel from violating the law, in order to protect themselves from liability.
According to Francioni, the reliance on PMSC personnel, or private contractors,
“diminishes the effectiveness of domestic mechanisms of democratic control over
30

Sarah Percy, Regulating the private security industry: a story of regulating the last war, 94
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 941–960,943, (2012), (referencing Sarah Percy,
Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007,
Chapter 7.).
31
32

Perret, supra note, 2, at 45.
Id. at 228.

33

Francesco Francioni, Private Military Contractors and International Law: An Introduction, 19 EUR J
INT LAW 961–964 (2008).
34

Id.
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armed forces, as required in all constitutional democracies.”35This is a scary fact to
face; PMSCs create a situation that has not been completely covered by international
law. For example, Katherine Chapman states that “private citizens employed by the
U.S. military in undeclared wars had fallen into a legal loophole, practically beyond
the reach of criminal law.”36She also states that, “PMCs must be held accountable for
their criminal actions, not merely to provide personal justice for those injured by their
crimes, but also for the strategic objectives of organizing the U.S. military's available
manpower effectively and retaining the support of citizens both domestic and
abroad.”37
The United Nations Human Rights Council’s working group on Mercenaries has been
given the task of analyzing PMSC activity and its effects.

The working group

mentioned four items that it saw needed to be addressed. First, due to the increasing
number of functions that PMSC personnel were performing which included
interrogation of prisoners, the “contractors were more and more in contact with
civilian populations and in situations where very serious human rights abuses could
and did occur.”

38

Second, regulation of military contractors was “virtually

nonexistent” in regards to national law 39 . Contractors are often used in countries
where the government or law is weak and the country they are operating in cannot
control the “use of force.” 40 The lack of regulation also included the Contractor’s
home countries, where there were no rules on vetting or training armed contractors.
Third, international law does nothing to mitigate the lack of regulation. There are no
clear rules on what “governmental functions can be outsourced” and things like
“direct participation in hostilities” and “engaging in combat functions” are not
covered either41. It is also important to mention that there is “no agreement on what
due diligence obligations, if any, a state has.” 42 Fourth, because PMSCs work
internationally, there is a greater need for an “international regulatory structure.” 43 In
35

Id.

36
37

Chapman, supra note 29, at 1048.

Id. at 1052.

38

Faiza Patel, Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: A Comprehensive Solution, 107
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 201, 201, (2013).
39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
40
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many cases there is no clear way of determining what state has jurisdiction and
responsibility.44
If this is not enough to convince the international community of the need to regulate
PMSC personnel, the two scandals involving major PMSCs should assist in
exemplifying the need for regulation. The first incident is the Nisoor Square shooting,
which involved the PMSC Company called Blackwater and ended with the deaths of
17 Iraqi civilians45. According to the New York Times article From Errand to Fatal
Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths: This incident occurred when PMSC personnel in a
convoy seemed to open fire on civilians. 46 To quote the article “the events in the
square began with a short burst of bullets that witnesses described as unprovoked.” 47It
seems the contractors were controlling traffic for a convoy carrying important
diplomatic personnel. While the Blackwater officials claim that their personnel were
shot at, and the shooting was in self-defense, witnesses say it was not self-defense.48
The second scandal is the Abu Ghraib prison issue, in which six civilian contractors
were involved in the abuse of detainees49. According to the Washington Post article 6
Employees From CACI International, Titan Referred for Prosecution: “CACI
interrogators used dogs to scare prisoners, placed detainees in unauthorized "stress
positions" and encouraged soldiers to abuse prisoners at Abu Ghraib 50 . Titan
employees hit detainees and stood by while soldiers physically abused prisoners.”51
One of the larger issues is highlighted by this quote in the article that claims the U.S.
military was "unprepared for the arrival of contract interrogators and had no training
to fall back on in the management, control, and discipline of these personnel.” 52 This
exemplifies the very issue of regulation and control of contractors. There is also the
issue of regulation in regards to vetting and screening, for example the article states
44

Id.

45

James Glanz & Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, October 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/world/middleeast/03firefight.html
(last visited Dec 17, 2014).
46

Id.
Id.
48
Id.
47

49

Renae Merle and Ellen McCarthy, 6 Employees From CACI International, Titan Referred for
Prosecution, The Washington Post, August 26, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A33834-2004Aug25.html (last visited Dec 17, 2014).
50

Id.
Id.
52
Id.
51
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“about half of CACI's interrogators were not properly trained and that the military
officer in charge of interrogations did not screen them before allowing them to
conduct interrogations.”53
These two incidents exemplify the need for regulation of PMSC personnel. The fact
that the U.S. military did not know how to “control and discipline” 54 these PMSC
operators lead to an incident of abuse.55 Without a system of regulation PMSCs are in
“legal loophole” and can function with some immunity. 56 PMSC personnel are not
necessarily any better or any worse than any other group, yet there should be an
international system of regulation governing these PMSCs and their personnel.

53

Id.
Id.
55
Id.
56
Chapman, supra note, 29.
54
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III.

How to regulate PMSCs

There are two popular thought processes when it comes to the regulation of military
contractors. The first school of thought comes from a scholar named Kristine Huskey.
Huskey believes that the current regulation of military contractors by the international
community is based on different “phases” to their operations and each phase is being
regulated differently. In this analysis of the “existing legal regime”, 57 Huskey picks
apart the international system of regulation and exposes its shortcomings. While this
theoretical system of regulation is complex it has the conceptual capability to work in
regards to both PMSCs and multinational corporations. This theory will later be
hypothetically intertwined with the regulation of PMSCs as multinationals.
The second school of thought, which is mentioned by many academics, and is the
school of thought I support, is the idea of labeling military contractors, thereby
putting them in a category that is part of the modern system of regulation. The idea
behind this school of thought is, in order to understand the possible avenues that
international law can take, in an attempt to regulate PMSC’s, military contractors
should be put in a category. Without a label, military contractors in essence may “slip
through the cracks” of international law, preventing regulation from taking place.
A. Huskey’s views
To begin with Kristine Huskey’s opinion on the phases of military contracting, and
how each phase is being regulated, I noticed that her opinion was created by a novel
and revolutionary analysis that, while she picks the current system apart, does have
the potential to be a solution to the problem of regulation in the future, assuming there
is no other way of regulating military contractors. Huskey’s thoughts stem from her
analysis of two of the largest events of misconduct that were perpetrated by military
contractors, namely the company formerly known as Blackwater which was involved
in the Nisoor Square shooting, and the companies Titian and CACI, and their torturing
of detainees at Abu Ghraib.58 One of the most disturbing realizations Huskey made
after her analysis of these incidents, is that all the talk of regulation and punishment,

57

Kristine A. Huskey, Accountability for Private Military and Security Contractors in the International
Legal Regime, 31 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS193, 193, (2012).
58

Id. at 194.
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came post-incident. 59 Following these incidents, there was an awareness of the
“available mechanisms for criminal and civil accountability of the individuals whose
misconduct caused the harm”. Huskey also makes a point of the weaknesses of postconduct liability analysis, stating that following an incident there is no way of
knowing who to hold accountable, should it be the state that hired the military
contractors, or whom? 60 Two questions Huskey points out, about “post conduct
accountability” are, first, “who is accountable for the conduct of PMSC’s?”, and
secondly “to whom…such conduct can be attributed?” 61 This is very similar to
Perret’s view on PMSC accountability when she states “The responsibility of private
actors for violations of human rights is in question under the law of many
jurisdictions.”62 To answer the questions of responsibility and accountability, Huskey
breaks down the use of PMSC’s into three phases.63 At every phase Huskey points to
who could be held accountable and possible systems of regulation. Basically, by
breaking the use of PMSC’s down, Huskey has noticed that there are multiple bodies
that could be responsible for regulation.

1. Three Phases
Huskey’s phase argument stems from her belief that not enough attention is being
paid to “pre-conduct accountability.”64She believes there should be a responsibility of
“hiring, hosting, and monitoring” of contractors, by those who use PMSC’s, as well as
a “responsibility to the victims” of misconduct by military contractors. 65In order to
understand the regulatory system, Huskey presents us with three “phases” which
cover “the "life cycle" of a PMSC.”66 The first phase is the Contracting Phase, the
point in time where the state is hiring PMSC’s or their personnel. In the Contracting
Phase the hiring state is extremely important because it has the ability to determine
important factors that play into contracting these personnel. Some examples of factors
that can be determined, by Huskey’s account, are things like “scope of activities to be
outsourced; who can be hired including license requirements, and what screening, or
59

Id.
Id. at 193.
61
Id. at 194.
62
Perret, supra note, 2.
63
Huskey, supra note, 57, at 195.
64
Id. at194.
65
Id.at 193.
66
Id. at 195.
60
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vetting, mechanisms can be used; whether previous allegations /conduct/ violations
play a factor in the hiring process; and the scope of the contract (for example, location
of contract performance).”67In essence the hiring state acts like a “gatekeeper” in that
they set the requirements and responsibilities of the PMSC personnel they are hiring.
Huskey gives an interesting example when she says “the hiring state can determine
that translation for interrogation (but not interrogation itself) can be outsourced.” 68
However, the hiring state is not the only one that has influence during the Contracting
Phase.69
The home state (the state in which the PMSC was formed and operates) has power
over PMSC’s during the Contracting Phase as well. The power and authority the home
states have is the power to suspend or remove the licenses of these corporations and to
prevent them from being hired. 70 So we see that there are two states that have
influence over the PMSC and their personnel during the Contracting Phase. One of
the most interesting facts about the Contracting Phase is that unlike the other two
phases, this phase is not involved with International Human Rights Law or
International Humanitarian law. In this phase domestic law is the system that covers
contracts, and the agreements made within them.71
The second phase is what is called the “In-the-Field Phase”. This is the phase in
which the largest amount of damage can be done and the most people can be affected.
At this point, also called the “theatre of war”, PMSC personnel will be “potentially
interacting with various individuals, such as military forces, other PMSC personnel,
civilian nationals and local police of the Host state.”72 This phase takes place in the
Host state, the state in which the PMSC personnel are operating, which is where
regulation problems can arise. Both the Host state and the Hiring state may have
differing opinions of how to regulate these personnel, and their interests for this
regulation may be “overlapping, or competing.” 73 There may also be issues in
enforcement of regulation, such as a “failed infrastructure” (Host state), which can
prevent efficient regulation from coalescing. In this phase the Home state,
theoretically, should be involved in regulation of their military contractors as well.
67

Id.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 196.
71
Id. at 197.
72
Id. at 196.
73
Id.
68
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The Home state should monitor the PMSCs and punish those actors who break either
the domestic law of the Host state or don’t follow “international guidelines.”74The
factors that Huskey lists for this phase include “domestic and international laws,
regulations, and codes of conduct applicable to PMSC personnel conduct in the field;
monitoring mechanisms, and which state has responsibility to monitor and ensure
compliance with such laws, regulations, and codes of conduct; and responsibility of
other bodies (for example, international organizations) for monitoring and ensuring
compliance with the same laws.”75
In this phase, Huskey believes that not only International Humanitarian law, but
International Human Rights law, can be applicable. There are many instances where
military contractors may have violated international law, yet the violence is used in an
unstable area, where the violence “doesn’t amount to a conflict.”76 In this case, where
there is no conflict, the laws of Humanitarian Law do not apply. Huskey goes on to
say that Human Rights Law may in fact have “a wider range of accountability
mechanisms” which she believes may include “monitoring by United Nations special
rapporteurs and field officers.”77 Human Rights Law also allows those who have been
wronged to petition their case, and there is a system in place for them to receive
compensation if they prove a harm done to them.78 International Human Rights Law
is applicable in situations of “reconstruction or civil strife”79 where there is no official
conflict. These situations are also where PMSC personnel are frequently deployed and
used. Also, there are non-derogable human rights that must be respected even during
an armed conflict. Therefore, International Human Rights Law is applicable to PMSC
personnel. One point Huskey makes concerning human rights, is the right to life,
which may be violated in cases where PMSC personnel are acting in self-defense or
are in combat. However, during a conflict PMSC personnel may violate the right to
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life if they are not considered “legal combatants.” 80 This is why labeling and
categorizing PMSC personnel is so important, without knowing where to put them we
don’t understand how to regulate them, or to consider some actions violations.
Another human rights violation that PMSCs have potential to violate is “the right to
be free from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment”, as set out by the
“United Nations Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment.”81 The reason that PMSC personnel have a potential to violate this right is
because many times they are used as guards. Their job may include guarding people
or detention centers.
As mentioned earlier, the Abu Ghraib issue was one of PMSC personnel abuses that
reached the level of torture as well as the use of cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment.82 These acts could not have been given legitimate reason to have occurred.
Even during a time of emergency or an armed conflict these rights cannot be violated
with the exception of “only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to
the life of the nation.”83 While International Human Rights can be used to regulate
PMSC personnel, there is also a draw back in using this form of law. For example,
during a time of conflict International Humanitarian Law is given the lex specialis
privilege and can override human rights. 84 Enforcement can also be an issue,
especially because International Human Rights Law only applies to people who are
“in the territory or jurisdiction of a state party to the instrument.” 85 There is also an
issue of responsibility for violations. To use an example from Huskey’s literature, “a
PMSC from Home State X, contracted by Hiring State Y, sends personnel to operate
in Host State Z—a failed state that lacks capacity to protect—it is unclear which state
has the legal responsibility to ensure human rights violations are not occurring in Host
State Z.”86, which again leads to the issue of categorization of PMSC personnel. The
80
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home state would be responsible for its armed forces if they violated an individual’s
human rights, yet because we have not categorized PMSCs it is unclear where the
responsibility lies.
The third phase Huskey recognizes is the “Post-Conduct Phase”; the phase where we
assume that a military contractor has harmed someone. Huskey, points out that this
harm can be the result of an act, or a result of an omission.87 At this point, following
the violation, the focus is on the consequential results of the situation. Will the victim
be given recompense and justice? Will the PMSC personnel responsible face criminal
charges? These are the questions that should be answered during this phase. The
important factors, according to Huskey, are the following:
applicable law or legal doctrines to determine who is accountable/liable (for
example, PMSC, individual, state) for the relevant conduct, and to whom;
applicable criminal laws and mechanisms, and which state or international
body has responsibility to enforce such laws, or, if not currently existing, to
enact them; applicable civil liability laws and mechanisms, and which state or
international body has responsibility to enforce such laws, or, if not currently
existing, to enact them; and responsibility to provide reparations to victims,
independent of civil liability lawsuits.88
While it is extremely important to determine who should be accountable for the
actions taken by PMSC personnel, Huskey also notes that it is just as important to
determine who is responsible to remedy the situation for the victims of these
violations.
2. Options for Redress
During the “Post-Conduct Phase”, International Human Rights law finds itself in a
situation that provides plenty of problems. To begin, even though it seems individuals
should be held responsible for International Human Rights breaches, it is actually
states that are held responsible. As stated in the ICCPR states must take measures to
assure they “exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm
caused by such acts by private persons or entities... [and]provide effective remedies in
the event of breach.”89 This leaves all of the power to the states, and their domestic
law to remedy the situation. Theoretically, this allows for a good system of criminal
87
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liability and punishment. By allowing the states to handle the situation themselves,
limiting the issues of international criminal charges and determining who tries the
accused contractors. However, these states may not feel they need to punish the
PMSC personnel for their actions. In this case, there is no international legal system
of enforcement. So if states choose not to punish the charged personnel, there is no
way to make them.
The individuals who have been harmed do have a system of recompense, under
international law. These people, who have suffered a violation of their rights, can
petition the Human Rights Committee. This, according to the ICCPR can be done in
order to remedy the situation; but can only be done only if the violation was
committed within the territory of a country who is “party to the Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR.”90 This can be avoided if the victims were “within the power, or under the
effective control, of a state party to the Optional Protocol in a territory which is within
the state’s extraterritorial jurisdictional reach.” 91 These facts, unfortunately lend
themselves to defend the United States, and its obligations in regards to the Military
Contractors in Iraq. Due to the fact that the United States is not a party to the ICCPR
Optional Protocol, it can be said that the US is not responsible for the punishment of
the PMSC personnel it brought to Iraq, or for bringing justice or providing reparations
to the victims. It should also be mentioned that the US would not be responsible for
ensuring that the PMSC personnel obey human rights laws, within Iraq. What is
worse is that because the US is not a party to the Optional Protocol, victims of the
actions executed by the PMSC personnel cannot petition for remedy.92
International Humanitarian Law provides little help, as well, when it comes to the
“Post-Conduct Phase”, it provides so little help that Huskey goes as far as to say “IHL
is mostly silent.”93When speaking about remedy and redress for victims, International
Humanitarian Law literally says nothing. 94 There are only three conventions of
International Humanitarian Law that allows for any analysis of PMSC personnel
during the “Post-Conduct Phase”. According to Huskey, the Fourth Hague convention
alongside the Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention are two tools that “may address
90
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state responsibility for organs”, these organs being the PMSCs they hire.95 However,
Huskey states that the “International Law Commission's(ILC) Articles on
Responsibility for States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” are what is really needed
to determine who is responsible for IHL violations in a situation involving a non-state
actor such as a PMSC.96 The issue with the ILC articles is that they are vague when it
comes to narrowing down responsibility. For example, it states in the articles that the
state is responsible for a private actor when “’empowered by the law of that State to
exercise elements of governmental authority’ or are de facto acting on its instructions
or under its direction and control.”97 In the case of the Nisoor square shooting, the
Black Water PMSC personnel involved, even though they were contracted by
America, did not necessarily perform actions attributable to the United States. The
American government claims they were “not acting as employees of the U.S.”98This
means that, according to the United States, Black Water was “neither exercising
governmental authority nor acting under its control or supervision.”99

3. Criminal law
Huskey also raises the question of International Criminal Law’s place in the system of
PMSC accountability in the “Post-Conduct Phase”. The most important aspect of
International Criminal Law is that it gives validity and power to International
Humanitarian Law as well as International Human Rights Law. It does this because it
criminalizes certain transgressions and violations of these bodies of law.100Huskey,
points out that International Criminal law has its basis in treaties, and international
customs.101 International Customs cannot be violated, and if they are the international
community can become involved. International Criminal law would be the strongest
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choice to use against violators, especially ones that are non-state actors, since
customary law holds jurisdiction over everyone. Huskey also mentions that
International criminal tribunals, such as the ICC or International Criminal Court
create jurisprudence which provides laws for International Criminal Law.
The reason Huskey mentions International Criminal Law in the “Post-Conduct Phase”
is that she says that International Criminal Law is “narrowly focused on achieving
criminal accountability of individuals during the Post-Conduct Phase.”102 By looking
at the ICC and the crimes under its jurisdiction, Huskey has narrowed down the type
of crimes PMSC personnel are most likely to commit. According to Huskey the ICC
covers “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community":
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression”. Huskey
believes that the crimes against humanity and the war crimes are the two crimes that
PMSC personnel are most likely to violate. 103 So if the ICC has the ability to
prosecute these crimes, why have there been not been more charges brought against
PMSC personnel who commit these crimes? The ICC itself has certain limitations as
well it seems. The ICC cannot prosecute people for these crimes unless the crimes
were “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of
such crimes.”104There is also an argument that states that PMSC personnel may not
even be able to commit “war crimes”; because “war crimes” theoretically must be
committed by “members of the armed forces of either party to the conflict, that their
acts are attributable to either party, that they are exercising public authority, or that
they are de facto representing the government to support the war effort.”105 A war
crime also has to be “part of a ‘widespread or systematic practice’” and must be used
“in furtherance of a State or organizational policy.”106 Labeling something as a “war
crime” seems to be a tricky issue, and can prevent criminals from being brought to
justice. Another issue is that the ICC does not have its own police or military force.
This makes enforcement very limited, and in effect creates a problem when it comes
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to investigation and prosecution. In these situations the ICC must rely upon the honest
help and cooperation of states.107
Huskey’s analysis of the current system of regulation, regarding PMSCs and their
personnel, is presented from an interesting angle. While I believe that PMSCs should
be put in a category, in order for them to be regulated more efficiently, Huskey’s
phased approach posits an interesting idea. If the international community were to
take these three phases that Huskey has analyzed, and create a system of regulation
based on the phases, they could regulate PMSC personnel more efficiently. For
example, there should be a certain standard of behavior and conduct that is spelled out
in the contracts of PMSC personnel. Since the hiring State is responsible for setting
the standards and responsibilities for these personnel, there should be a regulation of
the contracts and the agreements made. Phase by phase the system of regulation
would change, but it would help to organize the ways in which PMSC personnel are
regulated.
B. Categorization
The second school of thought, regarding the regulation of PMSCs, is the school of
thought that calls for a categorization of PMSCs and their personnel. The status of
PMSC personnel is a widely debated topic that could have a huge effect on the way
that PMSCs are seen by the public. The first theory, in regards to the status of PMSC
personnel, is that they are mercenaries, hired to fight. The second idea is that PMSC
personnel are actually civilian non-combatants who are hired for a variety of reasons
and if they join in battle they become “unlawful combatants”. The third, and not as
widely discussed category that PMSCs could fit, is that of Multinational corporations.
While this category seems odd, and not many authors have covered this category, it is
a personal favorite of mine. After researching PMSCs and analyzing the ways in
which they have, or could be regulated, in my

opinion that considering them

corporations and regulating them in that manner may be more effective then treating
them as mercenaries, or as unlawful combatants.
1. Mercenaries
The First School of thought, regarding military contractors, is that they act as
mercenaries, and should be legally labeled as mercenaries under international law.
107
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The first issue in labeling PMSC personnel as mercenaries is that there does not seem
to be a clear definition of what makes a fighter a mercenary. According to Sarah
Percy, contemporary critics define mercenaries based on two components: foreign
status, and motivation. Foreign status means that a mercenary should have “no
national association with any of the parties to the conflict in which they fight.”108The
second component that defines a mercenary is that his primary motive, his drive for
fighting is monetary gain.109 These two defining factors are immediately criticized by
Percy, and are dismissed as insufficient and incorrect. It should be mentioned that it is
not necessarily possible to determine the motivation of a fighter, and even if it could
be proven that a fighter is motivated by financial gain, according to Percy, his
motivations may change over time and he could “later adopt the cause.”110If a fighter
started to believe in the cause he is fighting for, then, according to the current view of
mercenaries, he would cease to be a mercenary because his motivations would have
changed. It is also known that many soldiers join the armed forces for financial
reasons. As Percy stated “the military promotes itself as a “career option” 111 with
attractive pay and benefits.”112
Under international law, the main definition of a mercenary can be found in the
Geneva Convention. In article 47 of Additional Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention
(sub section 2) a mercenary is defined using a number of criteria. Article 47 states:
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A mercenary is any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed
conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official
duty as a member of its armed forces.113
This definition is not only complex in nature, but it requires all of the criteria to be
met in order for a fighter to be considered a mercenary. For example, if it could be
proven that a fighter meets all the criteria, but the amount the fighter is paid is not
“substantially in excess of that...paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions…in
the armed forces” 114 then the fighter is not considered a mercenary. The term
“substantially in excess”115 is itself extremely debatable, and that is only a fraction of
the criteria that must be met.
There can be an argument made for labeling PMSC personnel as mercenaries. Of the
PMSC personnel functioning in Iraq twenty percent were citizens of the United States
of America, this is compared to the forty percent of “third country nationals” who
113
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were not U.S. citizens or citizens of the country they were functioning in.116 These
statistics show a large number of personnel who could potentially fit the Geneva
Convention definition of a Mercenary. U.S. citizens, would not fit the definition
because they are “a national of a party to the conflict” 117 and therefore they do not
fulfill subsection (d). The “third country nationals,”118 however, are not nationals to a
party to the conflict. This makes labeling them as mercenaries much easier. The
difficult part is determining if they “take a direct part in hostilities” 119 which is
debatable currently in international law. The other difficult part, in categorizing these
fighters as mercenaries, is determining their motivation. It seems almost impossible to
determine a fighter’s motivation. Even if it were possible, as I mentioned earlier,
motivations can change.120
Categorizing PMSC personnel as mercenaries would require an overhauling of the
definition of a mercenary, under international law. Many PMSC personnel would not
fit the definition, and this would create a system where regulation of PMSC personnel
is applicable only if the individual fighter fits the definition of a mercenary. The
definition is so ambiguous it is almost impossible to fit the definition of a mercenary.
“Any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to be shotand his lawyer with him!”121

2. Civilians/ “Unlawful Combatants”
The Second school of thought is that of civilian non-combatants. This school of
thought posits that PMSC personnel are hired for a variety of reasons and those that
actually see combat are considered “unlawful combatants”. According to Richard
Quigley, PMSC personnel who work with the armed forces are “civilian non-
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combatants whose conduct may be attributable to the United States.”122 The armed
contractors, however, create a situation that is not covered under international law.
According to Quigley, a civilian captured during an international armed conflict,
should notbe treated as a Prisoner Of War123, because they are considered civilians,
which means they are non-combatants and have not been granted permission to fight
in the conflict.124 This leaves armed contractors, as well as contractors that participate
in the hostilities in a “grey area.”125 Once military contractors begin to participate in
hostilities, which is hard to determine since participation is a hotly debated topic, they
become legal targets and can be tried as criminals for their participation.126
Combatants are fighters who have the “right to participate directly in hostilities,”127
and therefore these combatants cannot be considered criminals for the acts of war they
commit. They can only be held accountable for the actions that violate international
Humanitarian Law, especially things like war crimes. This is due to the fact that
combatants are lawful military targets.128 This means they have traded their civilian
status, and the protection of not being a lawful target, for the ability to fight, wound
and kill their opponents. Being recognized as a combatant allows for Prisoner of War
status, if captured and these POWs then “benefit from the protection of the Third
Geneva Convention.”129 So, one of the major differences between a combatant and an
“unlawful combatant” is the POW status given during capture. The reason the PMSC
personnel are not considered combatants is that they fail to meet the criteria. For
example, Quigley states that “groups that come under military command and meet
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certain criteria… qualify as combatants” 130 and because “contract employees fall
outside the military chain of command” they will not get POW status.131
The third Geneva Convention gives us an idea of what a prisoner of war is. In article 4
it states:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the
power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to
the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps,
including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being
130
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members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have
received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who
shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the
annexed model.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the
conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other
provisions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the
present Convention:
(1) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the
occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason
of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated
them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in
particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin
the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat,
or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to
internment.
(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the
present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent
Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern
under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable
treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception
24

of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph , 58 -67, 92, 126 and, where
diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the
neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the
Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a
conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform
towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the
present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties
normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and
treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and
chaplains as provided for in Article 33of the present Convention.132
A civilian who accompanied the armed forces without being a member of them which
could consist of “such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor units or of services responsible
for the welfare of the armed forces.” 133 This segment seems to cover Military
contractors who perform duties that do not constitute direct participation. The Geneva
Convention also touches upon “Members of other militias and members of other
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory”, however there are
criteria that need to be met for these militia fighters to be recognized, such as: “being
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;… having a fixed distinctive
sign recognizable at a distance; carrying arms openly;…conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war.” 134 If combatants are granted POW
status, and PMSC personnel are not, then it can be inferred that the PMSC personnel
are in fact not considered combatants.
This also tells us that civilians are people who are not included in Article 4’s sections
(1), (2), (3) and (6). Civilians, under international law, are “entitled to general
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protection against the dangers arising from military operations.”135 This also means
that armed forces are not legally allowed to target civilians. However, this also means
that civilians are not legally allowed to take part in hostilities and if they do so they
become a legal target for armed forces.136 What does this mean for PMSC personnel?
PMSC personnel, unless considered part of the armed forces of a State, and meeting
the criteria to be considered such, are civilians. Those PMSC personnel who choose to
directly participate in the hostilities are then considered “unlawful combatants”.
According to Dormann, this means they would be “… persons taking a direct part in
hostilities without being entitled to do so and who therefore cannot be classified as
prisoners of war on falling into the power of the enemy.”137These fighters are entitled
to some protection under international law. For example, “unlawful combatants” are
given the treatment as described by Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1. It is even
stated in Article 45 of Protocol 1 that “any person who has taken part in hostilities,
who is not entitled to prisoner of-war status and who does not benefit from more
favorable treatment in accordance with the Fourth Convention shall have the right at
all times to the protection of Article 75 of this Protocol.”138Article 75 of Additional
Protocol 1 specifies the “fundamental guarantees”139 of captured people.140
Article 75 -- Fundamental guarantees
1. In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in Article 1 of this
Protocol, persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do
not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under
this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as
a minimum, the protection provided by this Article without any adverse
distinction based upon race, color [sic], sex, language, religion or belief,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other
status, or on any other similar criteria. Each Party shall respect the person,
honour, convictions and religious practices of all such persons.
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2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents:
(a) violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular:
(i) murder;
(ii) torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental;
(iii) corporal punishment; and
(iv) mutilation;
(b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
(c) the taking of hostages;
(d) collective punishments; and
(e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
3. Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed
conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the
reasons why these measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or
detention for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the minimum
delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the
arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.
4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person
found guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to
a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court
27

respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure,
which include the following:
(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of
the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused
before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defense [sic];
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual
penal responsibility;
(c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the
national or international law to which he was subject at the time when it was
committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was
applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a
lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law;
(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his
presence;
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt;
(g) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him;
(h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in
respect of which a final judgment [sic] acquitting or convicting that person has
been previously pronounced under the same law and judicial procedure;
28

(i) anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the judgment
[sic] pronounced publicly; and
(j) a convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other
remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised.141
The article specifies that anyone who doesn’t “benefit from more favorable
treatment…shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a
minimum, the protection provided by this Article.”142In the article a list of acts are to
be considered “prohibited at any time any place” and they include things like murder,
torture, mutilation and standards that must be met if charges are brought against the
prisoner and standards for the trial.143
Considering PMSC personnel “unlawful combatants” is not the best route to follow.
By considering them “unlawful combatants” that also means there is limited control
over these personnel, since they are not part of the official armed forces. For example,
Jeffery Morton argues that by denying people POW status and combatant status we
actually “reduce the regulatory capacity” over certain fighters.144 A possible solution
would be to simply consider PMSC personnel combatants, solving many of the
problems of regulation. This, however, is likely not to happen. One of the benefits of
using PMSC personnel is that they are not considered part of the armed forces of the
state that uses them, a benefit many states are not willing to lose. Sid Ellington stated
that “the use of contractors allowed for ‘a much more politically palatable troop
count.’”145According to Francesco Francioni, using PMSC personnel can lead to “the
possibility of circumventing the requirement of parliamentary authorization for
specific missions and services” as well as “going beyond limits on the number of

141

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 75, 8 June 1977.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144

Jeffrey S. Morton & Presley Jones, The Legal Status of Mercenaries, 30 POLITICS & POLICY 624–
645,625, (2002).
145

Sid Ellington, The Rise of Battlefield Private Contractors, 13 PUBLIC INTEGRITY 131–148, 138,
(2011), (quoting Briody, Dan. 2004. The Halliburton Agenda: The Politics of Oil and Money. Hoboken,
N.J.: John Wiley and Sons).

29

troops to be deployed abroad or allowed to serve in a theatre of military
operations.”146

3. Corporations
The last and most recent way that Military contractors can be categorized, is by
treating PMSCs as multinational corporations. There is currently not much discourse
covering the idea of treating PMSCs as corporations, however it may yet prove to be
one of the better possibilities for regulation. By following the international system of
regulation for multinational corporations, PMSCs may behave in a better manner.
According to Andrew Clapham, the best way to ensure a company is brought “into
line” and to “ensure redress for the victims and ensure non-repetition” is to “highlight
the misbehavior of the company” which can have a negative effect on the company’s
future opportunities. 147 Clapham believes that the international community may be
able to bring PMSCs to heel by “focusing on the liability and reputation” 148 of these
corporations. While it is possible that many PMSC corporations, especially the wellconnected ones, do not fear a bad reputation, it is also possible that there will
eventually be a shift in way PMSCs are chosen. For example, if a certain PMSC
repeatedly gets caught violating international law and caught in scandalous situations,
states may choose a competitor that will bring less negative publicity.
Clapham believes that in the international system there has been a movement away
from “actual international law to norms and principles that are negotiated and adopted
by the relevant parties”. These “norms and principles” can include things like “codes
of conduct.”149 This supports the idea that PMSCs could be treated as multinational
corporations, especially because corporations may be willing to “go beyond the
traditional norms accepted by states.”150 In regards to things like “codes of conduct”,
due to the very fact that they are not treaties, more detail can be added to the text,151
and will more likely be accepted.
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Clapham also notes that there is a new shift in the system of accountability for
corporations. For example, to guide corporate behavior, states are focusing on the
certification these corporations need in order to operate. Clapham states that “gaining
or losing a certificate could be as effective, if not more effective, in affecting behavior
than winning or losing cases in the courts.”152Another advantage Clapham sees is the
ability for hiring states to demand that PMSCs abide by the codes of conduct.
Clapham mentions that the United Nations requires that “an armed private security
company must be a member company of the International Code of Conduct for
Private Security Service Providers.153 So it seems that the new system of control over
these corporations is reputation. PMSCs as well as other corporations are trying to
“minimize risks to their reputation.”154
Oddly enough, this system of categorization may please those critics who believe that
PMSC personnel are mercenaries. By focusing on the reputation of the PMSC
corporations, and regulating their ability to operate, states are focusing on the money
these PMSCs can stand to make. Those that believe that PMSC personnel are
mercenaries must also believe that their motivation is “the desire for private gain.”155
Threatening the ability of corporations to make profit would, theoretically, also
threaten the mercenary’s primary motivation for operating. Overall this category
provides for a new and novel way to regulate PMSCs. It appears that by categorizing,
and regulating PMSCs as multinational corporations, the international community can
more effectively control military contractors.
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IV.

Regulation of Multinationals

Regulation of multinational corporations, or MNCs, is a tricky subject, in the fact that
it intertwines with international law. The fact that multinational corporations operate
through and within multiple countries, and therefore multiple jurisdictions, can create
scenarios that are incredibly complex.
Specifically regarding human rights, Muchlinski states that multinationals, being
private entities, “do not have any positive duty to observe human rights…Thus it is
for the state to regulate…” 156 It is also interesting that Muchlinski points out that
multinationals only have the ability to influence human rights by treating their
workers well, but otherwise the rest is left up to the state.157 PMSCs are a bit different
insofar as they can also observe human rights law by their actions, yet the general idea
is similar, besides harming others, or mistreating their own people, PMSCs as well as
MNCs may not have any influence over human rights, meaning that states are the
primary actors of regulation and influence in that area.158
A. Sovereignty and territory
To begin, the sovereignty of each state over its territory builds barriers to
regulation.159 For example, if Germany wants to regulate a multinational based within
its territory, but operating in China, it has to be careful not to violate the sovereignty
of the Chinese state. As Muchlinski puts it “should the territorial principle of state
jurisdiction be observed to the letter, any assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a
state would amount to a violation of international law.”160 The sovereignty principle
creates a duty of “non-intervention”161, and prevents home states from regulating their
multinationals. 162 There is, however, a change beginning to take form. Brownlie
believes that the international legal system is evolving “in light of the need to modify
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the territorial principle.” 163 There are also alternative types of jurisdiction being
suggested, with the exception that they maintain a real “connection between the
subject-matter of jurisdiction and the territorial base”, and also that they preserve
“reasonable interests, of the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction.”164
The first principle that can be used to have jurisdictional domain over nationals in
foreign territory is the nationality principle.165 In certain cases, it is accepted that a
state can have “jurisdiction over its nationals abroad.”166 Using this principle, a home
state could, theoretically, justify jurisdiction over the activities of a corporation in a
foreign territory. The managers of said corporation “could be subject to home country
legal requirements.” 167 If there are no home country nationals on the board of the
subsidiary, the home country could make the parent company order its overseas units
to act in accordance with home country laws. This is done through the “nationality of
the parent company as the principle shareholder in the foreign subsidiary”, which
effectively negates the “foreign nationality of incorporation of the subsidiary.” 168
There is also the case of the parent company operating in foreign territory, “through
unincorporated branches” which will “retain the nationality of the parent” and in turn
can be brought under the “direct jurisdiction” of the home country because of their
“corporate nationality.”169 In the case of United States banks operating overseas, this
specific jurisdictional application has been significant for regulation.170
The second regulatory principle that may be applicable is the “objective territorial
jurisdiction” principle. This modification of the territorial principle comes into play
when the “elements of a criminal offence are commenced in one state and are
completed in another.”171 Originally accepted due to the infamous Lotus172 case, states
have asserted they should have “objective territorial jurisdiction over offences
initiated abroad and completed within the jurisdiction”.173 To reach “non- resident”
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units of multinationals 174 , the United States has put its antitrust laws into play
internationally, and states that “Anticompetitive conduct that affects U.S. domestic or
foreign commerce may violate the U.S. antitrust law regardless of where such conduct
occurs”175. It goes on to say that a violation can be committed by anyone no matter
“the nationality of the parties involved.”176 The international courts did not make clear
the limits and barriers of the principle; therefore it has been left up to the
interpretation of states.177 Decisions of the ICJ have shown, however, that there is a
need for a solid connection between the “subject-matter of the jurisdiction and the
territory of the state seeking to exercise its jurisdiction.”178
Exemplified in Muchlinski’s book, are situations in which states have attempted to
regulate their multinationals. One of the examples given is that of the “jurisdiction to
prescribe”. The United States has attempted to “extend its laws to non-resident units
of MNEs.” The way this has been justified is through the need for “regulatory
effectiveness in major fields of economic and public policy”. The U.S. has asserted
this principle for many reasons including: “to restrict exports of goods by overseas
subsidiaries… to prevent the avoidance of US trade embargoes;” or “to freeze the
assets of unfriendly powers held in banks accounts located in overseas branches of US
banks.”179 This principle shows that the “state has jurisdiction to prescribe on the
basis of territorial control, effects within the jurisdiction, the nationality of the person
or entity subject to control, and under the protective principle.”180
B. Legal forms of Multinationals
In order to understand the ways in which multinational corporations are regulated, an
analysis of the legal forms of multinationals must be undertaken. This analysis should
include such information as: nature of the business activity, transaction costs, the
extent to which the law will require the use of a particular structure and most
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importantly, the principal national characteristics of the firm as well as the legal form
within which they operate.181 However, it must be kept in mind that the goal of the
firm is to gain as much profit as possible182; therefore, it is safe to assume that firms
will usually try to reduce regulatory burdens.183
The first legal form of a multinational corporation to be analyzed is the “contractual
form”. In the contractual form of a multinational corporation, the corporation can
supply foreign markets without the creation of “an owned and controlled subsidiary in
the host state”.184 The legally binding contracts that are used by this type of firm can
go from one-time export deals to multiple or permanent “international
consortia”.185This type of firm has the potential to create a novel business category
due to the fact that it is an association that uses corporate and contractual systems of
operation, and therefore it is beyond the separation between corporations and
contracts.186 This multinational form is important to analyze due to its similarity to
PMSC operations. PMSCs operate as multinationals through contracts, and they do
not necessarily need a subsidiary in the state in which they choose to work.
The second form of a multinational corporation is the Public Private Partnership.
These contracts typically give concessions to foreign private contractors for a given
length of time “whereupon ownership vests in the public or private sector of the host
country.” 187 The organizational system that public private partnerships follow is
centered on technology and man power.188 Usually the private parties will obtain the
financial backing, usually by way of “project finance”, and supply the technology and
the knowledge of its use. The local partner will most often provide the workforce and
man power and many times the supporting infrastructure for the project. 189 The
advantage of a public private partnership is that the state retains its strategic control
over the operations and after the contractual period is done, it gains the assets and
attracts further capital for the future. This also helps accelerate the process of
construction in regards to the project.190
181

Id. at 52.
Id. at 515.
183
Id. at, 52.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.at 55. (referencing Schmitthoff’s Export Trade above n 3 at 512).
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
182

35

The third and most common idea of what a multinational corporation is the “equity
based corporate group”.191 This consists of a group of companies that are controlled
by a parent company. The parent company controls the other companies by holding
shares in said companies192. There are multiple forms of these groups, and they vary
in organization and their relationships. There is one main form of equity based groups
that Muchlinski touches upon, which seems most relative to the regulatory aspect of
MNCs. This structure is aptly named “the Anglo-American ‘pyramid’ group”.193
In this structure, a parent company “owns and controls a network of wholly or
majority-owned subsidiaries.” These subsidiaries can themselves be “intermediate
holding companies for sub-groups of closely held subsidiaries.” This creates a
pyramid like organizational structure, with the parent as the tip of the pyramid.
Muchlinski points out that when this “pyramid” is involved in multiple countries, this
forms the traditional and stereotypical view of what a multinational enterprise is, and
this model is what has guided most of the MNC regulatory thinking. 194 One of the
gaps, however, that this structure leaves, is the ability of a parent company to use their
subsidiaries to avoid regulatory laws. For example, Tom Hadden who studied the
“legal and business organization of three British corporate groups”195, discovered that
some corporations were using “agent only” businesses to reduce “the administrative
burdens of full disclosure.” 196 The way these companies avoided their disclosure
duties, was to transfer the assets from a subsidiary to a holding company. This
allowed the subsidiary to trade as an agent of the holding company, obliged only to
produce a formal balance sheet.” In this balance sheet, Hadden points out that the
“capital would be typically offset by a loan to the holding company.”197
Another important factor is the public. In today’s world information is more easily
accessible via the internet, which makes awareness of the operations and violations of
multinationals more widespread. Many might argue that although people know about
the violations and scandals of corporations, they still buy the products. I understand
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and agree that it does not always affect the corporation’s profits. However, the
younger generations seem to be showing more concern about the world and the
environment, and they may yet boycott these companies. Either way, the ability of
information to be received at one’s finger tips will keep the corporations worrying
about the possibilities of potential scandals and the consequences they stand to face.
In regards to PMSCs, violations, being easily discovered, may hurt their business. As
multinationals, PMSCs must look at their reputation as a selling point, a factor for
future business. A bad reputation could hurt them significantly and give the
competition an edge.

1. Regulating the different forms
In terms of regulation, the question then becomes is the “resulting legal structure” in
correspondence with the decision making structure of the corporation and does this
legal structure in essence cover put the corporation in a category, which then
determines its legal responsibilities.. It is important to point out that the current legal
structures of businesses, specifically contract and corporation, are not designed in a
way that can fully cover multinational corporations, due to their complex and
extensive nature. Contract is a system in which there is an “arm’s length relationship
between otherwise independent entities of equal bargaining power” and therefore
decision making power, responsibility and blame can be more easily placed. The
corporation structure is comprised of a “single unit enterprise owned and controlled
by its members”, and therefore it is responsible for its actions.198
In regards to contracts there is the possibility of control by one firm, which brings to
light an issue. Should the “contractual veil” be lifted or pierced in order to see who is
in control of the undertakings, to create liability for the actions, of the subordinate,
done under the directions of the dominant party. A similar question arises with equity
based structures, in the fact that the “veil” could be lifted in order to understand
between the parent and subsidiary companies, who made decisions they should be
held liable for.199
Some possible answers to these issues are outlined in Muchlinski’s work. When
analyzing the weaknesses of the contractual system, Muchlinski mentions the
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“'enterprise entity' ” theory which “deduces the parent company liability from the fact
of economic integration between itself and the subsidiary.” This in effect considers the
corporate group a new business association and paves the way for a “specialized legal
regime” in the future. 200 Muchlinski also states that competition laws be used to
defend the business independence of weaker of the two entering into the contractual
obligations.201
2. Reforms
When looking at the equity based multinational corporations, there are two reforms
that are proposed by Muchlinski. First, is preferred by Hadden, and leans towards a
reform of the structural side of the corporation. In this reform the corporation should
be restructured so it “more closely corresponds to its business organization.” This
includes the “existence of a relative unit for accounting, fiscal and other regulatory
purposes.” 202 Hadden believes in the “identifiable legal representation of the
underlying business activity,” which should be reformed to meet “modern
realities.”203 This could create “new group enterprise forms for equity based groups,”
which begs the question should informal alliances be required to reform and adopt a
legal form?204
The second reform method is preferred by Tricker, and is focusing on the operational
side of the corporation. Tricker proposes leaving the legal form of the company as it
is, but focusing on the obligations on specific establishments within the equity based
group. Tricker believes that there should be an increase of the “obligations placed
directly upon…divisions within the group.” From there he expects an “introduction of
greater divisional disclosure through the concept of an ‘accountable business
activity’.” Through this, managers become responsible for disclosing information
“according to the actual lines of decision-making in the enterprise.” This improves
upon the limits of the obligatory disclosure which is legally necessary, but only for
“incorporated entities”.205
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C. Corporate Social Responsibility
The actual regulation of multinational corporations can be looked at from many
angles. Different countries believe differently regarding the regulation of
multinationals or corporate social responsibility. Virginia Harper Ho points out that
the “constrained regulatory capacity” as well as “the limits of traditional command
and control regulation” has caused states to look for more efficient ways of
“incentivizing good corporate conduct” 206 . Governments are now involved in the
corporate social responsibility awareness, and demonstrate the acceptance of “soft
law” and other “quasi-voluntary standards” which will cause a push towards a set of
“minimum regulatory goals” 207 . While “soft law” may not have the strength to
regulate PMSCs, Corporate Social Responsibility may be able to navigate formal
regulation. As multinationals, PMSCs are concerned about profit and business, and
given the right incentives; any multinational might adhere to standards.
An example of such a movement by a state is found by examining the Chinese
corporate social responsibility policy. Throughout different levels of the government,
China has created a system by which they “promote CSR as an explicit policy
objective”208. One of the ways the Chinese government implements this, according to
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Virginia Ho is through “legal compliance or regulatory mandates”209. There are also
measures that are “beyond regulation” but these are tied to “institutions and incentive
structures”210. While China can be considered to be at the forefront in regards to the
level of governmental support of CSR, the western world is just now beginning to pay
attention to this issue.211

1. Definition
While Corporate Social Responsibility does not have a set definition, there are two
aspects that most definitions include: first the way in which a corporation conducts its
operations, which is also known as “good corporate citizenship”. The second aspect is
in regards to the corporation’s response to stakeholders of all kinds. These include
“employees, local communities and the environment.” 212 The first segment of the
definition touches upon the corporation’s goal to “adhere to moral and ethical norms
and make a positive impact on society” 213 . The second segment speaks about the
company’s responsibility not only to its shareholders, but to everyone who is
impacted by its operations, which is often in connection with the company’s
“contribution to economic and environmental sustainability” 214 . The parameters of
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what comprises good CSR are what is needed in regulating multinationals, as well as
PMSCs.
2. Compliance and Law
Corporate social responsibility has often been seen as “voluntary actions” that are
done by corporations and are “beyond what is required by law”215. This then lead to a
belief that corporate social responsibility was guided by private actors, and that it
functions “beyond regulation.”216 This also stems from the fact that the push for CSR
in developed economies, has usually come from the market, mainly from investors,
consumers and civil society organizations217. This being said, a good CSR record can
provide a corporation with a leg up on the competition. This also means that the
government’s involvement in CSR is based around its “core legislative and
enforcement function” 218 . In reality many segments of CSR like labor rights and
environmental protection have become “the subject of independent legal obligations
in most jurisdictions”219.
It is a common belief, however, that the separation between “soft law”, being
voluntary actions, and “hard law”, being “enforceable legal mandates” 220 , is not
distinct and cannot be the way that corporate social responsibility is identified 221. For
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example, Virginia Ho points out that “legal compliance is widely recognized as a
foundational element of CSR” 222 .

An example of this is found by looking at

ISO26000:2010, which is a standard created by ninety-nine countries that comprise
the International Organization for Standardization. ISO26000:2010 states that CSR’s
definition should include “legal compliance and ‘respect for the rule of law’” 223 .
Another example is the CSR pyramid that was developed by Archie Carroll. In this
pyramid, the base layer, the very foundation of the pyramid is law. Aspects such as
“corporate philanthropy, ethical and moral dimensions, and the internalization of CSR
strategy into firm operations” are all near the top of the pyramid, exemplifying the
importance of the law in CSR224. Furthermore, there are enforcement mechanisms that
split the division between voluntary and mandatory rules. As Virginia Ho puts it “both
legal obligations and CSR commitments that go beyond regulation can be enforced”
by these mechanisms that are found in the divide 225 . One example of this is the
enforcement of corporations “voluntary CSR commitments” by “NGO’s” and
“consumer activism”, which not only regulate in the present, but can also “influence
the content of future regulation as well.”226
It seems also that CSR and the law are “intertwined and mutually influencing”227. As
Virginia Ho states it, governmental “regulation, policymaking, standard setting” have
an effect on the voluntary choice to promote and use better business practices, beyond
222
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that of the “legal rules”228. Once governments start to set CSR policies, and those
policies become a part of their “legislative and regulatory functions” the line between
CSR and the law begins to become blurred 229 . The European council, however,
determined that the creation of “positive law and related regulations” in fact do serve
a purpose, which is to create a base upon “which voluntary CSR initiatives may
build.”230 Unfortunately, there are limits to the way in which these interact. Simply
shifting focus from the “legislative process…to the enforcement of enacted laws and
regulations” can create limits and problems 231 . With the increase of globalism,
multinational corporations, culture and the increased ability to quickly exchange
information, the limits have become more and more blatant232.
In regards to domestic regulation, governments have tried a variety of regulatory
options to try to work around these limits. One of the strategies has been to switch
from a “command-and-control, penalty-based regulation” to a mix of different
strategies, which include an emphasis on “voluntary and quasi-voluntary strategies”,
which takes the place of the threat of consequences, which is believed can influence
CSR operations in a positive manner 233 . For example, these strategies include
228
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“penalty waivers for self-disclosure of violations…and financial incentives for firms
who implement voluntary internal compliance systems.” 234 The most direct role a
government can play in the application of CSR is partnering. Partnering can include
“direct government collaboration with companies on specific projects”, which is a
public-private partnership. Another collaboration is the state’s support and
participation in efforts to promote CSR by international organizations, as well as
“state-mediated

dialogue

around

CSR

involving

companies

and

other

stakeholders.” 235 Virginia Ho makes an important observation, by saying that the
interaction between governments and corporations is “bidirectional” meaning that
“both contribute to evolving practices and policies.”236 Governments can work with
civil society groups to create joint working groups that determine the design,
implementation, and monitoring of CSR programs237. Governments also can mandate
CSR through “legislation and regulatory enforcement.”238 This can be done through
“mandatory sustainability reporting” or through “standards for the corporate codes of
conduct that may reach beyond legal compliance.”239The European Commission has
stated that the “top down” system of regulation plays an important part in “creating an
environment more conducive to enterprises voluntarily meeting their social
responsibility.”240
How does this relate to PMSCs? First and foremost, PMSCs, functioning as
multinationals, may find a demand from the market for CSR. On the other hand, the
market may not have such a demand. However, due to the violations and scandals that
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have appeared in the past, many in the market may want a good record of CSR, in
order to prevent bad publicity.
D. U.S. Multinational Regulations
While not as focused on CSR as other countries241, America has developed “various
cooperative enforcement tools that facilitate voluntary compliance with regulatory
mandates.”242 One of the ways they do this is by creating examples of CSR when the
government functions as a market player. For example, the “green government
procurement standards” have been adopted by Massachusetts and California among
other U.S. states 243 . Another advantage the United States has is a long history of
“public-private collaboration” which helps create a system of compliance and
responsibility among the corporate elements of American society244. Federal bodies,
such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of State and the Department of
energy have “award and training programs” which help create a sense of CSR
awareness. Federal programs also create awareness and interest in CSR 245 . The
“federal income-tax deduction for charitable contributions state constituency statutes,
and the creation of new stakeholder-focused business forms in some states” help
create awareness and interest in CSR within the private-sector246.
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1. Monitoring and the Corrupt Practices Act
Some federal regulations appear and help to monitor MNCs and their CSR. For
example, the disclosure obligations, required by the federal securities regulation
create transparency from some firms247. The United States also has other acts and
regulations that are intertwined with CSR. One of the most important of these is the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The FCPS, made in 1977, makes it illegal for “certain
classes of persons and entities to make payments to foreign government officials to
assist in obtaining or retaining business.” 248 It specifically speaks about using the
“instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly” and knowingly using money to
“induce the foreign official to do or omit to do an act in violation of his or her lawful
duty.”249 And on top of all of that the act also makes it necessary “for companies
whose securities are listed in the United States to meet its accounting provisions.”250
This act provides a great example of a government regulating its corporations even if
they are abroad. If nothing else it is a valid and possibly successful attempt at keeping
corporations in line in regards to corruption.

2. Standards and laws
To build a regulatory agenda, however, there must be a system by which standards of
regulation are determined. Sources of these standards, while not a fully “embracing
generalization”, regulation, and standards of regulation, are often based on “formal,
mandatory sources of regulation such as national laws, administrative rules, and
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binding international agreements.” 251 In the case of Corporate social responsibility,
these sources tend to be “non-binding voluntary codes or declarations.” 252 Some
sources, however, are legally binding if they are a convention on a specified issue253.
While most of the CSR sources are considered “soft law”254, “soft law” can become
“hard law” in the future255. For example, the “emergent new standards of customary
international law” are an observed transformation from “soft” to “hard” law. 256
Corporate Social Responsibility, while not necessarily a “hard law” system of
regulation, has influence and force over multinationals, as well as future
regulations257. CSR in a way can be seen as the most influential system of regulating
multinationals due to the incentives that it provides. It is a system that facilitates a
voluntary support and involvement 258 , which is more important than “hard law
regulation” in many ways. In creating a system by which multinationals choose to
follow CSR voluntarily, it can be taken as convincing them that it is in their best
interest and there is an advantage to be gained from the use of CSR. In a sense it
presents a “win win”, allowing both corporations and the community to benefit from
the use and observance of CSR. Also, if corporations feel CSR functions in their best
interests, they may hesitate more to violate it, because they will lose something,
caused by their violation.
If a corporation can break an international law, and the only result is a fine, or a public
scandal, they may feel it is worth it to violate the norm. However, if the corporation
has something at stake in their observance of CSR, and they have to make the
decision of whether or not to violate international law, they may determine it is in
251
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their best interest to simply observe international law and reap the rewards of their
CSR incentives. On top of that, with the CSR incentives added, the corporation stands
to lose those incentives, as well as face a scandal and international justice if they are
caught in violation of international law. This in essence adds another level of loss to
the corporation, if they decide to violate international law, or human rights law.
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V.

MNC regulation and PMSCs

Understanding the ways in which multinationals are regulated under international law,
it is plausible to consider regulating PMSC’s under that category. While the regulation
of multinationals is not perfect, it is at least existent and has multiple ways of creating
both voluntary and mandated observance of international norms and customs. The
regulatory system of corporations may not be the “glass slipper” when it comes to
PMSC’s, but it would seem that it is a possible solution.
PMSC’s are corporations. They run as businesses and the goal of business and
corporations, no matter what service or product they provide, or where they are
located, is profit259. As stated earlier, corporate scandal may not always hurt the profit
making ability of a business, however, many corporations will still try to avoid a
scandal. Realistically speaking, the international system can, and possibly should
view PMSC’s as businesses that render a service. It has been mentioned, multiple
times, that military contractors are not necessarily hired for combat functions260. This
means that when analyzing what system of regulation would fit, we need to take into
consideration the multitude of services they provide.
The military services market seems to be leaning toward the direction of
global corporations. Even though until the mid 90’s there were no “truly global
companies”, it seems to be changing261. The industry itself is expanding and including
a wider array of services that can be provided 262 . The market demand has caused
PMSCs to follow the “standard business techniques for market engineering used by
other types of firms”263. For example, many PMSC firms are either partnering with
others, or buying smaller firms. The acquisition of smaller firms gives the larger
corporation access to the niche markets and technological specialization that these
smaller firms possessed. This strategy allows the larger firms to compete on a global
scale, using “brand marketing and sub specialization.” Due to “complex security
situations”, “broader-based firms” offer a larger array of services which allows these
259

Muchlinski, supra note 253, at 515.
Perret, supra note, 2, at 45.
261
P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 83, (2003).
260

(referencing: Simon Sheppard, “Soldiers for Hire,” Contemporary Review, August 1999. “RAF
Puts Refuel Job on Market,” London Times, December 22, 2000.
262

Id. at 83.

263

Id.

49

companies to increase their market share more rapidly. This is due to the capital they
already contain, as well as the brand recognition through their records. 264
An example used by P.W. Singer is that of Defense Services Limited. DSL
hired primarily ex-SAS personnel, being that they were a British company. They
offered security training and consultation to multinational corporations stationed in
areas of conflict, and even guarded embassies. 265 DSL was bought by Armor
Holdings, which was an American company that originally was in the body armor
industry. Armor holdings did this in order to “build up its ‘risk management
services’”, and used a “growth through acquisitions-strategy.” Armor Holdings has
also acquired twenty other companies, and now has a new set of “military-related
services” including mine clearing and intelligence.266
Armor Holdings is also an example of a progressive firm which does more than
“military-related services”. With the expansion of technology, and the internet
relatively unregulated and as singer puts it “weakly controlled by governments”,
Armor Holdings found a fresh market. To build their “virtual security” support, Armor
Holdings has bought both IBNet and NTI, both in the internet security business.267
With the exponential growth of cyber threats, the investment in cyber security was a
great business decision that could hugely benefit Armor Holdings in the future.268
There are market niches to be had in this business, and while many corporations are
expanding their ownership and expertise to envelop other aspects of the “militaryrelated services”269270, some companies prefer to stick to their specialty271. This comes
from a concern regarding reputation, which, in this line of work, has the ability to cut
both ways272. For example, many firms involved in demining operations, while they
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“recruit many of the same ex-military personnel as larger, more diversified firms”273,
are considered to be doing humanitarian work. Demining is viewed as a more
acceptable operation than combat training or consulting due to the fact that it centers
on “weapons’ removal, rather than use.” 274 To prevent their humanitarian oriented
clientele from leaving for another firm, demining corporations often try their best to
“disassociate” themselves and their operations from the other PMSCs and the
“mercenary label”275. However, with more diversified corporations getting a foothold
in the demining field, it will be interesting to see if these corporations disassociation
from the rest of the firms make a difference in their success. 276
On the other hand, as stated earlier, some clientele prefer the “more aggressive,
smaller firms that can cut informal deals that bigger transnational firms cannot.”277
These firms care less for their reputation, and can utilize the “barter system of
payment that larger firms with scrutinized accounting practices would not be able to
employ”278. These firms fill a specific market niche279, which more well-known and
highly regarded firms cannot or are not willing to fill.
There is a third market segment, which is comprised of firms that “have their cake and
try to eat it too”. These firms try to fill the above two market segments, by having a
“central global brand”, but when they enter new local markets, they “rapidly spawn
new firms” to “take advantage of the benefits of such smaller organizations.” 280
Executive Outcomes serves as an excellent example. Right after deployment into a
country Executive Outcomes would “create a network of smaller local firms.” 281
Former employees would run the businesses which could be anything from “security
protection to airlift”. Some firms even moved out of the military services industry and
entered into things like telecommunications and vacation resorts.282
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There are many advantages to this form of corporate structure. These “stay-behind”
firms create a “marriage of local specialization and transnational branding”. This in
turn creates a “flexible network, loosely linking each new market into an overall
corporate structure.”283 Structures such as these provide advantages such as reducing
the regulatory capacity of domestic monitors, in the firm’s central country, which is
already limited to begin with284. This also allows the firm to “pack up and move”
whenever it needs “surge capacity for larger operations in one spot”.285
There is competition in these markets, however, and in less developed countries,
PMSC’s have begun to emerge. For example, demining firms in Africa are now in
operation, and take business from the larger richer companies.286 The market can also
be influenced by factors that create independent scenarios. For example, many firms
based in an area ravaged by war could actually have an advantage, comparatively,
because the war affects labor pricing and experience. 287 These firms can also,
generally, “provide relatively inexpensive military services that may be able to
undercut established Western Firms.”288 This provides evidence that in the future of
the industry, clients will have a broad spectrum of services to choose from, in the
military services field.289 Lower pricing will battle with higher technological options,
and “developing-region” PMSCs will compete with “Western-based firms” 290 .
According to Singer, it is likely that the most successful PMSCs will be those that
“move toward product integration” instead of focusing on lower prices or
technological specialties. In other words, success will come from the “best balance”
of pricing and quality.291
There is another avenue that may be taken. Smaller firms may be bought and
absorbed before they truly take off, in order to reduce competition. As Singer
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mentions, this specific “market seems to have a tendency toward consolidation”.
Larger corporations with more money will have the ability to make grand offers that
smaller firms may find hard to refuse. 292 This prevents the smaller firms from
threatening the larger firms competitively, and can give the larger firms a new
foothold in the market.
A. Three phases of operation
Using Kristen Huskey’s three phase model in combination with the current MNC
regulatory system, it is possible to imagine an alternative way to regulate PMSC’s,
assuming the international system views them as multinational corporations. By
attaching different regulatory demands and incentives to each of the three phases, the
operations of a PMSC and its personnel can more accurately be regulated, and held
accountable. Each phase of operation has specific differences that make it difficult to
find a specific regulatory system that fits. By using multiple regulatory options from
the multinational spectrum, in essence the international system could, metaphorically,
build a glove to fit the hand instead of trying to fit existing gloves to the hand. An
example is that of medieval armor, knights often had the armor made specifically for
them, made to fit their body only, allowing them better movement and comfort.
However, if one purchased armor that was not fitted to their body, it would not move
as easily, or be as comfortable. The raw materials of the armor are the same, just as
the regulatory raw materials are present. Fitting the regulation to the field is like
fitting the armor to the person, things must be shaped to align correctly.
Shaping the regulation to fit the situation will never yield a perfect solution; there will
always be fluctuations and different situations that don’t fall within the regulatory
framework. However, using the three phase model may provide enough variety,
allowing differing situations to be covered and understood. In other words, the
distinction between each of the three phases creates a new regulatory umbrella that
can be used to cover a specific situation.
In the first phase of regulation, the Contracting Phase, Huskey seems to give the
power to the hiring state.293 294 In effect the hiring state is given some responsibility in
regards to who they hire and why. If regulatory bodies were indeed to put the three
292

Id.

293

Huskey, supra note 7, at 195.
Id.at 196.

294

53

phase theory into effect, then the responsibility in contracting would be completely on
the hiring state. This is an important example of how the three phases can clarify
accountability in the case of violations. In regards to the contract, the responsibility,
and accountability can be directly traced to the hiring state. The contract contains the
responsibilities and duties of the PMSC personnel.295 Therefore, the hired personnel
cannot argue that they were given orders that they contractually had to follow. If the
order falls outside of their contractual responsibilities, then, theoretically, they are
accountable for performing the action.
One way of viewing the contractual relationship between PMSCs and a national
military, is to see it as an international consortium. Muchlinski defines this as “an
organization which is created when two or more companies co-operate so as to act as
a single entity for a specific and limited purpose.”296 In the case of PMSC and their
relationship to national militaries, there is a “limited purpose” in that they are “cooperating” during war or peace time operations, for specific reasons. Contractually,
there can also be Public Private Partnerships, specifically when a state uses the
services of a “foreign private contractor”. As stated earlier, in this situation the State
being the larger of the two groups, provides the financing and technology, and the
local party that has been hired will provide the “workforce and supporting
infrastructure”.297 If there is indeed a Public Private Partnership, this allows the state
to

remain

in

“strategic

control”

of

the

project.
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Using the regulatory framework for multinationals, it is easier to see who is
accountable for what in the contractual phase. One of the other benefits of the
contractual phase is that regulation can also come from the home state299, the state in
which the PMSC is based. Potentially the home state and the contracting state can be
one in the same, giving them twice the regulatory power. According to Huskey, the
home state has the ability to suspend and/or take away the licenses of said
corporations.300 This keeps business inactive and can even close down a corporation.
Given that the most impactful and the principal jurisdictional level for multinationals
is the home state, extraterritoriality becomes a problem. However, with the three
295
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phase argument, the nation state has the regulatory power, responsibility, and
accountability for the contracting phase.301 302 With the home state’s influence over
the contracting phase, it can prove that there was no “direction and control”303 during
a violation, and it can be used as evidence to absolve the state of any responsibility.
The second phase, called the in-the-field phase, is where regulation truly matters. In
this phase the potential for violations and criminal acts becomes more apparent, and
therefore should be regulated more acutely. Unfortunately, this is also the phase in
which regulation is hardest to enact and enforce. The main problem with national
regulation is that the multinational, in this case the PMSC, operates across the limits
of national jurisdiction. This results in a “mismatch between…the managerial and
operational reach of the firm and…the jurisdictional reach of the state that seeks to
regulate”304. What the state may choose to do, is “extend the operation of its laws
outside its territorial jurisdiction,” resulting in a case where it applies the “laws
extraterritorially”305. There could also be a prescription of laws that are applicable to
the whole of multinational groups. This would be done regardless of the
multinationals presence in a foreign country.306 This is important for multiple reasons
that extend beyond the image of the state to the international community.
Muchlinski provides a scenario that works for multinationals and PMSCs equally.
Muchlinski states that a home state may want to prevent its multinational “from
trading with potential enemy powers.”307 PMSCs should also be regulated in the same
manner to prevent them from being hired by enemies or potential enemies of their
home states. Due to the nationality of the parent corporation, and the control it has
over its subsidiaries, this can be done. 308 This may also happen in the contracting
phase as well, however, to control the subsidiaries; it has to be done while they are in
action. A subsidiary could easily deceive the home country or even its parent
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company, and actively operate under the direction of a foreign government. By using
the nationality principle, the legal nationalities of the subsidiaries are overcome by the
law of the home state of the parent company309. What this entails is, the home state
imposing legal duties on the parent company310. To control the subsidiaries, the parent
company must be ordered to “direct the acts of the subsidiary in the required
manner.”311 Basically, a state wants to ensure that the “overseas unit of the MNE acts
in accordance with the law that governs the activities of the unit present within the
regulating state.”312
Muchlinski has determined that the extraterritorial application of regulation is usually
done by stronger states. The reason this is, is because there can be conflict caused by
the imposition of laws on a multinational operating on foreign soil. The host state may
see it as a violation of their sovereignty. 313 The exercising of jurisdiction across
borders, according to Muchlinski, is based on the “regulating state’s power and
confidence in the validity…of its policies.”314 In the specific case of PMSC personnel,
this could also be seen. For example, if a European PMSC was hired to guard a
compound in Africa, and was later ordered to fight rebels, the European home state
could intervene to prevent this from happening. The host country may be upset that
the home state’s government stopped their operations, yet on an international scale,
the operations of the PMSC personnel bordered dangerously on mercenary activity,
and would put these personnel in a different level of danger. The European state
would be extremely confident in their decision, even if the African country disagreed,
and considered it a violation of their sovereignty.
Muchlinski also makes a point to state that the host country, especially if they are a
weaker or less developed state tends to be more accepting of the extraterritorial
regulation.315 While they may be upset with the violation of their sovereignty, or the
jurisdictional dominance, however, they may accept it as “the price to be paid for
foreign aid and investment.”316 This is when a subsidiary of a PMSC or the PMSC
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itself is operating in or for a host state. A PMSC may also be hired by a state other
than its home state, and be used in a third state. In this case the state that hires the
PMSC is labeled as the hiring state, while the state it is operating in is the host state.
In a scenario where a home state, or a hiring state send their PMSC personnel into
foreign territory, most likely the state in which they are deployed, the host state, will
not object to regulation by the home or hiring state.
According to different cases in international law), it seems that extraterritorial
regulation, at least in some scenarios can and does happen 317 . However, “civil
regulation”, a system by which informal regulation is enacted through NGOs318, may
be overlooked in the global order. This system of regulation involves “both
cooperative approaches, under which NGOs and MNEs act in partnership to
further…social responsibility goals” 319 . While many PMSCs may not want to be
involved with NGOs, others may. For example, many demining firms may want to
organize with NGOs in order to exemplify their difference from other PMSCs. There
are also more critical avenues that can be taken, in a partnership between PMSCs, or
multinationals in general, and NGOs. Assuming PMSCs and MNCs have an ultimate
goal of profit, they can be hurt by bad publicity. NGOs in partnership with other
multinationals can highlight “corporate malpractice” and “monitor compliance with
voluntary and/or mandatory standards”320. While this may seem to have little impact,
it has the potential to whip PMSCs into shape. Bad publicity can always hurt the
company, and if there is an international group, such as an NGO, watching them
closely, then they may think twice before breaking the rules.
The third phase, in Huskey’s model, is the “post-conduct phase.” At this point, it is
assumed that PMSC personnel have harmed someone, or violated an international
norm, or law. First and foremost, if one of three core segments of international
criminal law, namely genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, is violated,
any businesses or individuals can be held liable321. For example, after world war two,
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officials of German corporations were held liable for international crimes that were
“connected to active participation in the Nazi regime”. 322 The second strategy to hold
corporations liable is to seek redress for damages through a lawsuit323. The lawsuit
does not necessarily have to be filed in the home country of a corporation, but can be
filed in a country where a corporation’s assets are located 324 . If nothing else, the
lawsuit can bring attention to the violation and may change popular opinion of the
business.
The redress phase, while important to exemplify the consequences of a
violation, is not as important as the other two phases for a simple reason; the violation
has already occurred. While redress and punishment are important, they are reactions
to the violation, not a solution or a preventative measure. As mentioned earlier,
Huskey believes what needs to be determined in this situation is “applicable law or
legal doctrines to determine who is accountable/liable (for example, PMSC,
individual, state) for the relevant conduct, and to whom; applicable criminal laws and
mechanisms, and which state or international body has responsibility to enforce such
laws...”325. However, as also stated earlier, in regards to post conduct situations, “IHL
is mostly silent.” 326In comparison to domestic law, murderers are punished for their
crimes, yet people still choose to murder, even knowing the punishment that could
await them. Why would this be any different for international violations, especially if
consequences are not as dire? In summation, these violations need to be prevented,
not reacted to. The third phase, the “post-conduct” phase is important, but once that
phase has been entered, the violation has already happened, and it is too late.
B. Corporate entity
One thing that should be considered an advantage, however, of labeling PMSCs
multinational corporations, is the legal liability a corporation may have on the
international scale. Corporations are “granted existence by the state” but are
considered a “legal person” under the law327. This means that multinationals can be
sued, and held accountable for violations of international law. Theoretically, this may
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be advantageous, in so far as if a corporation, as a legal entity, is brought before an
international court for violations it has committed, and is sued, the entire corporation
loses that profit. This may have more impact on future operations; the reason being, it
hurts profit. For example, if one person in a PMSC violates international humanitarian
or human rights law, that person may be held accountable in the international justice
system, and the corporation may suffer some bad publicity. However, if the
corporation itself is brought to court and sued for a large sum, it affects everyone in
the corporation. As Muchlinski states, a MNCs “only social responsibility is to make
profits...”328. Assuming the goal of PMSCs is to make money, the loss of profit would
matter more than the loss of an employee, and the subsequent scandal following a
violation. Potentially, this could create a scenario where employees are more closely
monitored and self-regulation is taken seriously in order to prevent a loss of profit.
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VI.

Conclusion

PMSCs are not categorized under international law, causing a loophole in
regulation. 329

330

Similarly, there are issues in regulating multinational corporations.

There are however, systems of authority and control that can be implemented to
regulate multinationals. A gap in regulation under international law is always
dangerous and should be closed. There are many theories regarding the regulation of
PMSCs, one of which is placing them in an official category and thereby applying the
regulatory bodies and rules to these PMSCs. One of the categories that PMSCs can fit
is that of a MNC or a multinational corporation. 331 This category is advantageous
because PMSCs are in essence businesses that operate across national boundaries.
However, the advantages also include other categories. For example, another category
some have placed PMSCs in is the ‘mercenary’ category. 332 While the legal definition
of a mercenary is extremely hard to meet, and easy to avoid as a label333, mercenaries
are, in essence, focused on profit.334 This is the same as a corporation which has a
simple goal of profits. Labeling PMSCs MNCs also means that the drive of the PMSC
is profit335 336, meaning that PMSCs can be affected, and regulated in regards to their
profits, the same as mercenaries. Overall, however, international MNC regulation
provides a good base to regulate PMSCs. Using Huskey’s three phases of regulation
in combination with MNC regulation, PMSCs can be more thoroughly regulated, and
accountability more accurately determined. In addition to regulation, being considered
corporations may allow a PMSC as an entity to be held accountable for violations.
The possibilities are there, and while the system has gaps, it seems it could be an
answer in the future.
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